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ABSTRACT A widely accepted view in the cultural evolutionary literature is that culture
forms a dynamic system of elements (or ‘traits’) linked together by a variety of relationships.
Despite this, large families of models within the cultural evolutionary literature tend to
represent only a small number of traits, or traits without interrelationships. As such, these
models may be unable to capture complex dynamics resulting from multiple interrelated
traits. Here we put forward a systems approach to cultural evolutionary research—one that
explicitly represents numerous cultural traits and their relationships to one another. Basing
our discussion on simple graph-based models, we examine the implications of the systems
approach in four domains: (i) the cultural evolution of decision rules (‘filters’) and their
influence on the distribution of cultural traits in a population; (ii) the contingency and sto-
chasticity of system trajectories through a structured state space; (iii) how trait inter-
relationships can modulate rates of cultural change; and (iv) how trait interrelationships can
contribute to understandings of inter-group differences in realised traits. We suggest that the
preliminary results presented here should inspire greater attention to the role of multiple
interrelated traits on cultural evolution, and should motivate attempts to formalise the rich
body of analyses and hypotheses within the humanities and social science literatures.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0343-5 OPEN
1 Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden. 2 Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, UK. 3 School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden. *email: ab2086@cam.ac.uk;
magnus.enquist@su.se; Fredrik.jansson@su.se
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2019) 5:131 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0343-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms 1
12
34
56
78
9
0
()
:,;
Introduction
Research in cultural evolution aims at understanding andexplaining cultural change at multiple causal levels (e.g.,Mesoudi, 2011; Colleran and Mace, 2015; Gjesfjeld et al.,
2016). Culture, like many targets in science, is complex, with
multiple processes interacting at a variety of spatial and temporal
scales. This is evident both in the multiple definitions of culture,
many of which selectively highlight features and processes of
culture and cultural change (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952;
Weiss, 1973; Keesing, 1974; Mesoudi, 2011), and in the variety of
methods used to decompose and analyse the constituent causal
processes of culture.1 Despite variation among these attempts at
describing and understanding the complexity of human culture,
there has long been consensus on its key features: that culture is
composed of a number of distinct elements (or traits), that these
traits bear varying relationships to one another, and that these
traits are realised in overlapping yet heterogeneous ways by dif-
ferent populations in the world.
In calling this a consensus, we draw attention to the long
history of viewing culture as a complex dynamic system, com-
posed of multiple traits and their relationships, which can change
over time. This is a view arguably as old as the discipline of
anthropology itself: clear precursors of such thinking can be
found in the writings of British sociocultural evolutionists
(Stocking, 1987) and the various schools of nineteenth century
German anthropology (Smith, 1991). This consensus view per-
sisted in the works of twentieth century American evolutionary
anthropologists (Carneiro, 2003), as well as in anthropology’s
interpretivist, structuralist, and post-structuralist traditions
(Kuper, 1999). More relevant for current considerations, this
consensus view is also evident in the qualitative descriptions
accompanying early cultural evolutionary models (e.g., Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985) and in
banner claims about the scope and power of cultural evolutionary
theory (e.g., Sperber, 1996; Henrich, 2016).
Nonetheless, formal modelling within the contemporary cul-
tural evolution literature has tended to idealise away key features
of this consensus picture. Large families of models represent
culture via a small number of traits, and, further, represent such
traits as ‘atomic’ elements with no substantial interaction between
them (e.g., Durham, 1991; Henrich, 2001; Kitcher, 2001; Henrich
and Boyd, 2002; Rogers, 2010)—with a few notable exceptions
(e.g., Enquist et al., 2011; Kolodny et al., 2015). Typically, when
multiple traits are represented, they are taken to vary along a
single dimension (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd
and Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2004), or function as an index of
some other feature of interest (e.g., Fogarty and Creanza, 2017;
Fogarty, 2018). While these models are all significant achieve-
ments, by idealising away multiple traits and trait interrelation-
ships, they may be unable to represent a range of phenomena;
notably those where the clustering of traits influences the
downstream origination, distribution, and change in the trait pool
over time.
Consider, as an illustration of the complex relationships among
traits, communities of the Tyva Republic. The Tyva are pastor-
alists who engage in seasonal migrations. As they migrate from
pasture to pasture, the Tyva engage in costly rituals around cairns
that mark out pasture boundaries, regional borders, and salient
geographical landmarks. These costly rituals involve offerings of
food, tobacco, money, and the performance of ritualised beha-
viour. As experimental and ethnographic evidence shows, a
plausible explanation for the origin and persistence of these costly
rituals appeals to the Tyva’s pastoral subsistence strategy. The
rituals demonstrate to nearby populations the acknowledgement
of local norms, and in so doing, may diffuse potential tensions
about the use of common resources—such as pasture lands—by
unfamiliar and potentially untrustworthy economic free riders.
The costly rituals, then, signal trustworthiness and cooperation to
the groups whose land may be being crossed and grazed (Sosis,
2005; Purzycki, 2010, 2011, 2016; Purzycki and Arakchaa, 2013).
This example shows how a rich system of interlocking religious
practices, moral judgments, and patterns of subsistence can
jointly explain the origin, organisation and persistence of costly
rituals as a solution to intergroup relationships and the man-
agement of resources. Such a complex explanation, however,
requires explicit consideration of multiple cultural traits, specific
ecological circumstances, and salient interrelationships between
the two.
The case of the Tyvan pastoralists is illustrative of the need for
a broad theoretical and empirical endeavour aimed at capturing
the dynamics of multiple cultural traits and their interrelation-
ships. Here we motivate a systems approach as such an endeavour.
We do so by examining implications of such an approach for key
features of social transmission and the acquisition of traits, and
how these generate macroevolutionary patterns and features. We
illustrate these with simple models, and draw on a range of
empirical and theoretical literatures to suggest how such models
might be expanded into a broader research program. Though we
here adopt a graph representation of trait interdependencies for
modelling culture and cultural change, we nonetheless think there
may be multiple ways of modelling cultural systems that better
represent the complexity and heterogeneity of its constituent
parts. Given this, the current paper may best be understood as
offering one avenue through which a more fully-fleshed systems
approach—that is, a distinctive approach encompassing novel
models, concepts, and research questions—may be realised. The
major contribution of this paper is to lay the conceptual foun-
dation for such a research endeavour.
Despite the limited aspirations of the current piece, the con-
ceptual ground-clearing we undertake here does suggest some
immediate methodological and epistemological benefits that
come with adopting a systems approach. Importantly, the explicit
representation of traits and their interrelationships highlights
how traits themselves function as a novel medium through which
causes of cultural change can intersect at multiple levels. As we
suggest below, the traits agents acquire can change how they
learn, modulating the overall behaviour of the population in
which they are a part. At the same time, the aggregate behaviour
of the population can influence the availability and valence of
such traits. The systems approach thus highlights how individual
(micro) and population (macro) levels can influence one another
through effects on trait relationships and availability. Here we
predominantly focus on the first of these levels, looking at the
effects of multiple traits and their interrelationships at the indi-
vidual level. Yet we expect these models to complement the
growing body of macro-level models (Kandler et al., 2012), and
we return to consider multilevel causation and macro-level phe-
nomena more fully in the discussion section.
A second important upshot is that a systems approach allows
for the modelling of processes of path dependence and self-
organisation (Enquist et al., 2011). Already well-recognised
within evolutionary and systems biology (e.g., Kauffman, 1993,
Carroll, 2005, Sansom, 2011), network interactions can impose
structural and situational constraints that influence the syn-
chronic behaviour and diachronic constitution of such networks.
The graph-based models we adopt here provide some of the first
links between this literature and cultural evolutionary theory—
links that we also consider in more detail in the discussion.
The plan for the paper is as follows. After a brief introduction
to the approach in the next section (§2 ‘What is a cultural sys-
tem’), we highlight four domains of phenomena for which the
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systems approach has implications at both the microlevel and
macrolevel: the cultural evolution of decision rules (‘filters’) and
their influence on the distribution of cultural traits in a popula-
tion (§3 ‘Cultural filters’); the contingency and stochasticity of
system trajectories through a structured state space (§4 ‘Evolu-
tionary trajectories and historical dependencies’), where trait
interrelationships modulate rates of cultural change (§5 ‘Stability
versus change’); and, where trait interrelationships contribute to
inter-group differences in realised traits (§6 ‘Group phenomena’).
We conclude by highlighting a number of possible avenues for
future research, noting that a systems approach is poised to
formalise and make explicit theories and hypotheses concerning
culture that have been made in the humanities and social
sciences.
What is a cultural system?
Researchers identify a wide variety of entities as candidate cul-
tural traits. Typical lists include such diverse things as beliefs,
myths, stories, and material artefacts, and often include larger
societal structures like practices, norms, and institutions, like
kinship systems or subsistence strategies (see e.g., Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Mesoudi, 2011;
Henrich, 2016). Many of these elements bear connections, or
relational properties, to one another that impact the acquisition,
maintenance, and transmission of other traits. Beliefs, for
instance, bear evidential and entailment relationships to other
beliefs. If I believe that the dice are loaded, then I should change
how often I expect to roll a seven. Material artefacts bear rela-
tionships to one another, often in ways that affect their func-
tioning. Tin and copper, for instance, combine to make an alloy
suitable for weapons and cookware, while tin and mercury make
an amalgam suited for silvering mirrors. Speaking generally,
models adopting a systems approach aim at capturing three key
features: an explicit representation of multiple traits (perhaps of
multiple trait types); trait relationships of different valence and
character; and how traits and their relationships generate
dynamic interactions over time. To put the motivation for a
systems approach briefly, in human cultures, traits bear a wide
range of relationships to one another, and these can have a variety
of important consequences.
In the illustrations of this paper, we represent traits and their
relationships as weighted graphs, where the nodes are the cultural
traits, and there is a weighted edge with a positive value between
two nodes if the traits are compatible, and with a negative value if
they are incompatible. Relationships can also be asymmetric and
represented with directed edges. In our simulations, there is a
well-mixed population of agents, who are gradually replaced
through a birth-death process. Agents can acquire traits either by
inventing, through sampling from the universe of available traits,
or by copying other agents. Agents copy traits with a probability
proportional to how compatible the observed trait is to all other
traits in the agent’s current repertoire. The ideas in this paper are
most clearly illustrated using small cultural systems and trait
universes, so we will typically include only a few traits in the
models, but our approach is general and could easily be scaled up
to include many traits, with a range of asymmetric compatibilities
on a continuous scale. For a specification of the simulation model
and the parameter values used in the different examples, along
with Python code implementing it, see the Supplementary
information.
One important kind of consequence of a systems approach
bears upon how traits may be distributed in a population. To see
this, consider a simple model with four trait types: A, B, C, and D.
Assume that these trait types begin with equal starting fre-
quencies in a generational model with random copying. On the
assumption that traits are acquired independently of one another,
one would expect the frequency of trait types to be autocorrelated
over time, varying only with the vagaries of random copying. Yet
when pairwise relations are introduced—for instance, where traits
pairs (A, B) and (C, D) (or AB and CD for short) facilitate the
acquisition of their partners and inhibit the acquisition of other
traits (e.g., C and D inhibit the acquisition both of A and of B,
and vice versa) (Fig. 1)—this simple arrangement generates very
different dynamics, ones that eventually settle into an equilibrium
state where most agents have either AB or CD trait pairs (Fig. 2).
Of course, the nature and effects of trait interrelations them-
selves may change over time. This too is an important con-
sequence of approaching culture as a system constituted by linked
elements. Note that a preference (for a cultural trait) can also be
considered a cultural trait. Shifts in preferences and beliefs are
particularly noteworthy, as these both govern behaviour and
change constantly in the face of exposure to new evidence and
ideas (Fig. 3). In our modelling framework, preferences could be
modelled with a positively weighted edge from the preference
trait to the preferred trait.
The complex tangle of changing traits and relationships can be
illustrated by looking to the work of Heidi Colleran and collea-
gues (2015; Colleran, 2016; Colleran and Snopkowski, 2018) on
the demographic transition—the decline in fertility that has been
observed in multiple human populations over the previous two
centuries. The demographic transition is a striking trend, with
families around the world increasingly limiting themselves to two
or fewer children. It is also an unusual trend, evolutionarily
speaking, since standard evolutionary reasoning would hold that
organisms should produce as many viable offspring as their
resources allow.
As Colleran articulates it, the demographic transition is a
complex phenomenon, with tangled and imbricated causal pro-
cesses interacting at multiple levels. Decisions on childrearing are
influenced by the makeup of social networks, the prevailing social
norms, ties among kin groups, socioeconomic classes, and more
encompassing structures such as the regulations and institutions
of the local polity and state. Nonetheless, distinct causal pathways
and their effects can be discerned. For instance, combining eth-
nographic work with sophisticated network and statistical ana-
lyses, Colleran (2016) and Colleran and Mace (2015) were able to
chart the distribution of contraceptive strategies used (if any)
among a group of communities in Poland—separating out gen-
eral contraceptive strategies (any decision or strategy for
Fig. 1 Cultural system with simple attraction and repulsion. The left panel
shows which pairs of traits attract and repel, and the right panel shows an
example with individual repertoires and relationships between individuals
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controlling fertility) from ‘artificial’ contraceptives (encompassing
a range of modern contraceptive technologies).
Colleran’s explanation highlights both individual-level and
population-level causes. At the individual level, agents exerted
variable influence: knowledge and use of contraception strategies
by close kin and friends were key causal factors in determining
not only whether any particular individual would use contra-
ception, but also the particular strategy adopted. Yet community
level indicators such as religiosity and education played an
important role modulating and changing both the rate at which
contraceptive strategies diffused through populations, and the
particular strategies adopted. Highly educated populations
accelerated the adoption of contraceptive strategies in general, but
had limited effects on the spread of artificial contraceptives.
Highly religious populations, on the other hand, tended to slow
down the adoption of artificial contraceptive use, but not the
diffusion of contraceptive strategies and decision-making more
generally. Thus while individual networks and the transmission of
knowledge and preferences are important, average population-
level characteristics also influence the diffusion of contraceptive
strategies by changing the background conditions against which
individual transmission occurs (Colleran and Mace, 2015).
This example illustrates both the aspirations and the difficulties
of a systems approach to culture: there is an enormous range of
possible traits and trait relationships that are affected by wide-
ranging causes. We cannot hope to offer an exhaustive taxonomy
of such entities and effects in this paper. Nor do we suggest that
the models we develop here provide more than thumbnail sket-
ches as to how multiple interrelated traits might influence the
composition and structure of culture over time. Nonetheless, by
combining illustrations using graphs and simulation models with
existing empirical research, we hope to articulate a number of
implications of such models, sketch a number of compelling
research objectives, and provide the conceptual tools for devel-
oping a distinctive systems approach to culture.
Importantly, we see the humanities and social sciences as
playing an important role in the development of a systems
approach. From Marxist approaches to postmodernism,
researchers in philosophy, anthropology, literary studies, sociol-
ogy, and many more besides have developed a range of theories
and hypotheses about how best to describe cultural traits, their
interrelationships, and the structures that they produce. It would
be an overwhelming task to summarise the riches of the many
fields in the humanities and social sciences, but we suggest that
these resources have mostly not been integrated into the datasets
or everyday theorising of cultural evolutionary research.
The reasons for this lack of integration may be a number of
disciplinary and methodological features. One might be reticence
on the parts of humanities and social scientific scholars regarding
the past history of unilinear theory, which promulgated racist and
Eurocentric accounts of cultural development and change
(Steward, 1955). Another might be the failure of current work in
cultural evolution to speak to the phenomena that interest
researchers within the humanities and social sciences, perhaps
because of mutual ignorance of the rich literatures within the
humanities and social sciences (Ingold, 2007) and of cultural
evolution (Lewens, 2015). Or, perhaps, the lack of integration
may reflect methodological differences, with many of the theories
and results of the humanities being resistant to formulation in
formal, quantified models (Mesoudi, 2011).
These are all legitimate explanations for the lack of integration
and conversation between the cultural evolutionary literature and
other scholars within the humanities, social sciences, and natural
sciences. Yet we think one roadblock not sufficiently addressed
concerns the family of models used by many cultural evolutionary
researchers. While humanities and social science scholars are
interested in complex phenomena—often involving the interac-
tion between behaviour rich in semantic information, networks of
social interactions, material artefacts and persisting institutions—
many prominent cultural evolutionary models focus on the
evolution of a few select cultural traits, or traits that vary along a
single dimension (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Mesoudi et al., 2006; Rogers,
Fig. 2 Number of individuals with 0 to 4 traits, over time. Two traits can either be compatible or incompatible
Fig. 3 Cultural system with preference traits. The left panel shows
examples of traits relationships, where + indicates a preference for a trait,
and – a preference against it. The right panel shows examples of three
individual repertoires, where II acts as a cultural model. Individual I is more
likely to copy II, including the preference for B, since I prefers A, while
individual III has an aversion to II due to trait A
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2010). Moreover, when such models do build in more traits, these
typically are taken to evolve independently of one another (Hahn
and Bentley, 2003; Henrich, 2004; Bentley and Shennan, 2005;
Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Enquist et al., 2008; Strimling et al.,
2009; Eriksson et al., 2010; Aoki et al., 2011). Though these
families of models are impressive, and have generated a rich body
of research, they represent a substantial epistemic gambit, one
akin to that undertaken by mid-twentieth century work in
population genetics (Provine, 1971). Within cultural evolutionary
theory, this strategy holds that the dynamics and structure of
cultural evolutionary phenomena can be extrapolated from
models that represent a small number of cultural traits interacting
in independent (or non-epistatic) processes. This kind of strategy
licences the modelling of simple trait systems, either with an eye
to describing the kinematics of those simple systems, or to illu-
minate the evolution and operation of mechanisms underpinning
their transmission (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich,
2004).
To be clear, many, but by no means all, modelling families in
contemporary cultural evolution are based on equations and
results drawn from populations genetics. Yet, even those that do
not tend to adopt the epistemic gambit of extrapolating from
simple trait systems that model only a few, independent entities.
These models have produced an exceptional range of compelling
theoretical and empirical results. Yet what we are stressing here is
that these models need to be complemented by those that
explicitly represent how multiple traits and their interrelation-
ships together affect the downstream distribution and structure of
the cultural trait pool. In these circumstances, a systems approach
that explicitly represents these elements and their relationships is
needed. We turn to highlight these scenarios in the next four
sections.
Cultural filters
A common view among many cultural evolutionary researchers is
that the cognitive architecture implicated in cultural evolution is
composed of special-purpose evolved cognitive mechanisms
(Sperber, 1996; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004, 2006; Boyd and
Richerson, 2005; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Mesoudi, 2011;
Sperber and Mercier, 2017). As a case in point, early cultural
evolutionary models (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985) explicitly
assumed that mechanisms for social learning and selective social
learning strategies were under genetic control. Subsequent mod-
elling and empirical work continued to assume the innate nature
of these strategies—like prestige bias (Henrich and Gil-White,
2001) and conformity bias (Henrich, 2001)—usually on the basis
of their perceived ubiquity in human populations (cf. Henrich,
2016).
Yet recent empirical research challenges many of these
assumptions. Consider the recent work on selective social learn-
ing—the capacities involved in adopting particular strategies for
learning from others. Work in both experimental and develop-
mental psychology plausibly suggests that selective social learning
strategies emerge from simple associative learning, where learners
acquire links between certain individuals or cues and the value of
information (reviewed by Heyes, 2018). This dovetails with
developmental results that suggest that children preferentially
attend to models on the basis of a number of cues, including
competency, reliability, status, and certainty, as well as features
including relative age, resemblance, and sex (Wood et al., 2013).
Other evidence suggests that the nature of the cues, and their
weighting in particular circumstances, is also controlled by
associative mechanisms (Behrens et al., 2008; Heyes, 2018).
Selective social learning may thus result from simple mechanisms
of learning conjoined with exposure to the local structure of the
informational landscape. Such exposure leads to the association
between simple cues and the identification of agents bearing
useful information across a range of situations.
More generally, there is growing empirical research supporting
the claim that even central capacities of human social learning
may be culturally evolved. Philosophers and psychologists have
recently argued that the plasticity of human psychology provides
opportunity for the acquisition not only of strategies for learning
(as above) but also of novel cognitive functions. Kim Sterelny
(2003), for instance, has argued that mindreading capabilities—
the capacity to attribute and explain behaviour using mental state
attributions—are assembled in development in an environment
“soaked not just by behaviourally complex agents, but with agents
interpreting one another” (p. 222). Such an assertion is backed up
by a range of empirical results that suggest that the acquisition of
key capacities differs in sequence and rate across different
developmental and cultural circumstances (Siegal and Peterson,
2008; Wellman and Peterson, 2013; Shahaeian et al., 2013;
Peterson et al., 2017). More recently, Cecilia Heyes (2018) has
argued that not only mindreading, but also imitation, selective
social learning strategies, and language may be the result of
simple domain-general learning capacities occurring within cul-
turally enriched, and perhaps designed, learning environments.
These accounts suggest that cultural evolution may be critically
involved in the evolution of what we call filters: ‘decision rules’
that modulate the flow of traits in a cultural system.2 These filters
not only include those involved in acquiring traits—such as is the
case with selective social learning, which sifts and sorts different
sources of information—but also those involved in innovating
(deciding whether to introduce a trait or set of traits to a system)
and diffusing traits (deciding, out of many traits, which to
express). We call these capacities ‘filters’ because they do just that:
they filter out some traits while letting others through.
At this point, it is helpful to distinguish between origin
explanations and distribution explanations (Godfrey-Smith,
2012). The accounts emphasised above provide origin explana-
tions, which aim at explaining how a particular trait came about,
often by pointing to studies in palaeoanthropology, develop-
mental and experimental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience
that lay out the evolutionary and developmental circumstances
required for certain capacities to come about. Sterelny (2003) and
Heyes (2018) are exemplary in this regard in bringing together a
wealth of such data in their synthetic cultural evolutionary
accounts of the origin of critical cognitive capacities of human
beings.
Distribution explanations, by contrast, explain the distribution
of traits in a population, or across populations. Food preferences
represent one domain where filters may contribute to a dis-
tribution explanation. There is great between-culture variation in
patterns of acceptance and rejection of food, and individuals are
often strongly influenced by their cultural backgrounds in what
foods they come to like or find distasteful (Rozin, 1988). Though
only supported anecdotally, acceptance of fermented foods—for
example, the slimy Japanese soybean ferment called natto or the
strongly ammonia-scented fermented shark kæstur hákarl from
Iceland—is often highly regionalised and culture specific (Katz,
2012). This may be because food acceptance or rejection is often
tightly linked to culture-specific norms around what is considered
disgusting (Rozin et al., 2016). Fermented foods are, after all,
foods in a controlled process of decomposition. In this example,
culture-specific norms influence individuals in filtering out pos-
sible traits (natto, kæstur hákarl) as incompatible with those they
already possess.
In the discussion, we offer some speculations as to how a
systems approach may contribute to origin explanations. But by
and large, the graph operationalisation of cultural systems
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adopted here is apt for providing distribution explanations that
demonstrate how cultural filters might modulate downstream
distributions of traits.
We close this section by considering two ways in which such
modulation might occur. The first is through direct, or trait, fil-
tering, where the relationships between traits influence the dis-
tribution of other traits. The case of food preferences is case in
point. Here, the history of trait sampling by a population means
that only some traits are available for individuals to acquire.
These realised traits then influence decision making: some foods
are desirable, while others are filtered out in virtue of being
disgusting.
Yet traits might also be modulated through indirect filtering,
for instance, where such filters determine with whom one
associates. One such indirect filter is the example of selective
social learning (or model-based filtering) given above, where
individuals selectively choose from whom to learn on the basis of
informational cues. With such a filter, the traits one acquires will
be skewed by the model one is oriented towards. Another indirect
filter is a similarity filter, where individuals associate with others
who bear similar traits (sometimes called homophily), either
through deliberate choice of association, or by pruning their
social networks of individuals with dissimilar traits (Axelrod,
1997; Centola et al., 2007). Unsurprisingly, similarity filters
decrease the within-group heterogeneity while increasing the
across-group heterogeneity of realised traits.
Evolutionary trajectories and historical dependencies
Interdependencies among traits reduce the number of sets of
cultural combinations that are likely or even possible, and as a
consequence, the number of likely or possible evolutionary tra-
jectories that lead to those assemblages. For clarity of illustration,
we will here consider strict dependencies, such that traits are not
only facilitated by, but also contingent on, the existence of other
traits. This can be illustrated by a simple unidirectional example.
Consider ten traits, labelled by the first letters of the alphabet.
Were the traits to be unilinearly dependent, as in Fig. 4a, subject
to stepwise acquisition—such that B was contingent on the
existence of A, C on B, and so on—then there are only ten
possible cultural combinations: one for each trait, including all
the preceding traits it is contingent on. There is also only one
trajectory for each combination: the one that passes through each
trait in alphabetical order, up to the last possible addition.
Compare this to the case where traits are independent, with no
limitations on the order of acquisition. In this case, the state space
of possible combinations explodes. Any combination of traits is
possible, so the state space equals the power set of the ten cultural
traits, meaning that the number of potential combinations is
210= 1024 (minus one if we exclude the case of having no cul-
ture), and doubles for every trait added. The number of evolu-
tionary trajectories that lead to such states is almost ten million
(
P10
i¼1
Q10
j¼1 j ¼ 9; 864; 100). Interdependencies thus provide a
path dependence that can significantly facilitate the emergence of
a particular cultural system on several occasions.
Relationships between traits can also lead to more complex and
diverse cumulative culture, beyond the trivial accumulation of
making culture larger by adding independent elements to a col-
lection of traits, and beyond the predetermined stepwise acqui-
sition of the previous example.
Cumulative culture is likely to be a significant contributor to
path dependence in cultural evolution. When traits are preserved
and build upon past innovations, culture generates traditions—
historical chains of cultural variants linked through patterns of
cultural transmission. Cultural evolutionary researchers often use
the metaphor of a ‘ratchet’ to describe this historical process, since
like a ratchet, things move steadily in a single direction—changes
are kept, ‘ratcheted’, into the future rather than ‘slipping back’
over multiple transmission events (Tomasello, 1999; Dean et al.,
2014). This ratcheting metaphor is meant to capture the way that
cumulative culture differs from a range of possible (cultural)
evolutionary scenarios—for instance, where evolution occurs sto-
chastically, moves cyclically through a range of variants, or merely
tracks environmental features in ways that do not involve building
upon priorly held cultural variation. In so doing, cumulative
culture can explain the production of climate appropriate clothing
(Boyd and Richerson, 2005), counter-intuitive food extraction and
processing techniques (Henrich, 2016), social organisation and
institutions (Bowles and Gintis, 2013; Richerson et al., 2014), the
differentiation and specialisation of tools (Basalla, 1988), and
culturally evolved cognitive novelties (Heyes, 2018). Because
cumulative culture produces traditions where future states of the
tradition depend on the past states of that tradition, it is the kind
of process that generates path dependence.
There have been only a few attempts within the cultural evo-
lution literature that describe or model path dependence, partly
since most previous models cannot describe historical processes
of ‘ratcheting’ in ways that account for dependencies between
traits. One recent exception is a model of the cumulative evolu-
tion of technology (Kolodny et al., 2015). Central to the model is
a highly structured description of a cultural state space, which
delimits three kinds of cultural innovations. The structure
involves a central ‘main-axis’ with stepwise modification as in the
unidirectional example above, but each trait on the main-axis can
also be modified in a separate direction, to create ‘toolkit inno-
vations’, and traits on the main-axis can be combined. While this
sequential and combinatorial structure may be apt for under-
standing the evolution of (some aspects of) technological evolu-
tion, it seems less apt for characterising the opportunistic and
creative processes involved in myth and storytelling (Morin, 2016;
Acerbi et al., 2017), ritual and religions (Whitehouse, 2000), or
social norms and institutions (Sperber, 1996; Bowles, 2004).
The combinatorial combination of traits in Kolodny and col-
leagues’ model draws attention to the various relationships
between traits. As illustrated by Enquist et al. (2011), two
important kinds of interdependencies that can structure the
cultural state space includes the combination and differentiation
of elements. A sweater consists of a combination of cloth and
thread, items which can be used also for other purposes. Even
Fig. 4 Example dependencies between traits. Here, traits are (a) unilinearly
dependent, (b) arranged in a tree structure, (c) combined in different ways.
Traits can also be acquired in different sequences (d, e) and inhibit other traits
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though a needle is not part of a sweater, it vastly facilitates the
creation of one. With the further introduction of cultural traits,
for example, dyes or pigments, we can have a differentiation of
sweaters, such as different colours. Simple graphs exemplifying
such relationships are given in Fig. 4b, c. Representing relation-
ships between traits in graphs like these enable us to easily
describe facilitative and inhibitory relations, characterise the
possible and likely trajectories of cultural evolution, and to con-
sider how such relationships among traits themselves might
produce new kinds of path dependent phenomena.
The existence of an organised—that is, structured—cumulative
culture means that culture can carry traces of its historical tra-
jectory, and, thus, has deep history (Sterelny, 2014; Sterelny and
Hiscock, 2014). To illustrate this, consider the graph in Fig. 4d,
with four traits, A, B, C and D, of which the latter three depend
on the existence of another trait, and which can all be inhibited by
another trait. For clarity of illustration, let us assume that the
inhibition is strong enough to completely suppress the inhibited
trait, such that the carrier loses it.3 Were these traits to be
independent, there would exist 24= 16 possible cultural states
(including the possibility of having no culture). The traits of such
independent assemblages may have occurred in any order (and if
traits can disappear and reappear, then potential evolutionary
trajectories are boundless), and as a result, the state of a particular
system contains no information on its history, except that its
constituent elements must all have occurred (at least once) at
some point. The relationships between traits, posited in Fig. 4d,
halves the number of possible states, and there is one unique
trajectory leading to each of these states. The possible states that
include at least one trait (and the corresponding trajectories) are:
{A} (A), {B} (A→ C→ B), {C} (A→ C), {D} (A→ C→ B→D),
{A, B} (A→ B), {A, D} (A→ B→D), and {C, D} (A→ C→D).
Even if the present state of a cultural system does not include all
traits that had (at some point) been acquired over their evolu-
tionary trajectory, the scheme of relations makes it possible to
recreate their evolutionary history. The fact that culture, due to
these structural constraints, often carries so much of its history
also enables cultural evolution to have complex path dependence
while having the Markov property in terms of predictability:
while historical events dictate where we are now, the future cul-
tural states depend only on the present state.
It is a straightforward conclusion from the fact that cultural
traits can have downstream effects arising from their interrela-
tions, or compatibility, that acquiring certain traits can have vast
effects on which traits can be acquired later on, and thus
potentially lead to cultural systems that differ in most of the traits
they include. For an extreme example, consider the tree-like
structure in Fig. 4c. Each new acquired trait prevents the acqui-
sition of the traits on the other branch, by making them
unreachable.
Yet it is not only which traits are acquired that determines
which cultural states are accessible, but also the sequences of
events can determine which traits can coexist. Let the traits B and
C be dependent on A, and B be compatible with C but inhibit A,
as in Fig. 4e. The two traits B and C can then be maintained
simultaneously, in the same system, provided that B is acquired
first. If, on the contrary, C is acquired first, then there are no traits
allowing for the acquisition of B. As an example, A may be a
generic or non-explanatory answer to a politically charged issue,
B a populist answer, and C a complex answer providing a real
explanation. B could then be attractive enough not to be lost in a
population even in face of a real answer, and even if it would not
appear if there already existed such an answer, while C could
easily replace the unsatisfactory answer A. The importance of the
sequence of acquisition is further amplified if B and C enable
different clusters of traits down the line.
For a more concrete example based on Fig. 4e, consider the
Lancet MMR autism fraud. In 1998, former physician Andrew
Wakefield (A) submitted a paper linking the MMR vaccine to
colitis and autism spectrum disorders. (B) The paper was
accepted and led to a drop in vaccination rates and a loss of
confidence in their safety, with a concomitant increase in anti-
vaccination propaganda (e.g., Gross, 2009). However, the paper
was filled with flaws, the results had been misinterpreted, it had
been conducted unethically, and its main findings were later
refuted, which led to (C) a late rejection (a retraction) of the
paper by the Lancet twelve years later (Dyer, 2010). Even so, the
strengthening of the anti-vaccination movement that B sparked,
and the spread of anti-vaccination ideas it caused, was not can-
celled out by C. Had the paper been rejected, C, directly, without
publication, then that would have inhibited B and its
consequences.
Stability versus change
Empirical observations of cultural phenomena reveal extensive
variation in the rate at which culture changes. These rates can
range from traits and systems that remain more or less the same
over many generations, to traits and systems that change rapidly
within a single generation. For instance, there are many examples
of religious beliefs and social norms that have remained similar
over long periods of time (Geertz, 1973; Glenn, 2010). At the
same time, however, clothing styles may be subject to fast changes
(Shepard, 1972; Belleau, 1987, Herzog et al., 2004). Not only are
there diverse rates of change, but these rates themselves may also
change over time. To give one example, Gjesfjeld and colleagues
(2016) show how changing rates of origination and extinction
rates have changed the landscape of car models, with competition
between manufacturers being a substantial driver of a decreased
diversification in automobile models. And, of course, different
elements within culture may vary in their rates of change.
Comparative and phylogenetic studies of language evolution, for
instance, demonstrate both fast and slow changes in different
lexical and grammatical elements (e.g., Greenhill et al., 2017).
A number of explanations have been suggested for the varia-
tion in the rate of change in cultural evolution, including external
factors such as the physical and ecological environment (Vegvari
and Foley, 2014), demographic factors (Powell et al., 2009), and
cultural complexity (Querbes et al., 2014). Here, we explore how
trait relationships and a systems view of culture could potentially
explain variation in the pace of cultural change. Two factors seem
important to consider. One is the intrinsic properties of traits that
determine their relationships with other traits, and the other is
filtering processes that may favour collections of traits that either
promote stability or drive change. We first consider trait rela-
tionships that can promote stability and then relationships that
can drive changes. We end with describing systems with fashions
or fad-like dynamics, in which traits may change more quickly
than when they are modelled as independent traits.
It is a plausible extension of the idea that traits are more or less
compatible with one another that traits which mutually support
each other’s transmission could form stable cultural clusters that
are maintained over many generations. We have investigated this
idea in a series of simulations similar to those in the other sec-
tions. Here we generated a situation with 20 traits with pre-
dominantly negative relationships, and explored how groups of
two, three or four mutually supporting traits could influence each
other’s existence in such a trait environment. Examples of these
simulations are illustrated in Fig. 5 (see the Supplementary
information for more details). It shows, in the situation explored,
that two mutually supporting traits promote each other only
ephemerally, with three traits the effect was stronger, and finally
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with four traits a stable cluster was formed. Note that two traits
have only one relationship; three traits have three relationships;
and four traits have six relationships that can support stability (in
general, n(n− 1)/2, where n is the number of supporting traits).
Though the model emphasises the stability brought about
through compatibilities between traits, incompatibilities or
negative relationships could also contribute to a stable cluster if
these inhibit traits outside the present cluster. This would
decrease the likelihood of new traits invading the cluster in
question.
This supports previous work showing that such conservative
tendencies can easily evolve (Ghirlanda et al., 2006; Acerbi et al.,
2009; Acerbi et al., 2014). In these models, individuals are born
open and acquire traits in interactions with other individuals.
Whether copying occurs depends on how compatible the
observed trait is with the other traits already acquired by the
individual (this is what we call trait filtering above). The reason
why conservatism evolves in these models is that open individuals
are more likely to acquire traits that make them more con-
servative while conservative individuals are less likely to acquire
traits that make them more open. Over generations, increasingly
conservative systems become established.
As one can see, the stability of cultural systems—or as is more
likely to be the case, specific trait assemblages—is plausibly pro-
moted both by mutual relationships among its parts, and
potentially by incompatible relationships with traits not part of
the system. This describes one kind of evolutionary history; here,
trait assemblages successively increase internal compatibility and
decrease external compatibility. If such features were to char-
acterise most traits of a cultural system, then one would expect
such a system to eventually enter a basin of attraction where little
subsequent change could occur. However, as we will see, there are
also circumstances and arrangements of trait relationships that
promote change.
While mutual support can give rise to stable cultural systems,
there are other relationship distributions that will promote
change rather than stability. Some arrangements may even give
rise to rates of change that are higher than for independently
evolving traits. One type of trait relationship that would promote
change rather than stability is an asymmetric relationship
between two traits: for instance, trait A may facilitate the acqui-
sition of a trait B while B has the opposite effect on A (inhibiting
its acquisition). Such an asymmetric relationship could lead to a
succession of trait replacement events. If A appears first, then it
will promote B, but when B becomes common, it will cause A to
disappear. The processes are directly dependent on properties of
the current cultural system and can lead to an accelerating gen-
eration of new cultural traits (Lehman, 1947; Ogburn, 1950;
Enquist et al., 2011; Kolodny et al., 2015).
Theoretical work also shows how fluctuations in the rate of
change may arise, with periods of rapid change interspersed with
periods of slow change (Aoki, 2015). Within the humanities, a
classical model for such fluctuations in the rate of change is the
ideas of dialectic processes (Cohen, 1978), which recognises that
cultural systems may give rise to internal contradictions that
promote substantial changes to the system. This idea seems fully
compatible with the theory of cultural systems suggested in this
paper. However, we are not aware of any theoretical work
demonstrating for instance a correlation between the rate of
change and the degree of internal conflict or incompatibility in a
system.
Evolving traits relationships may, under certain assumptions,
give rise to very high rates of change typical of fashion or fashion-
like phenomena (Acerbi et al., 2012, Michaud, 2019). To see this,
suppose that there are two kinds of traits, both of which can be
transmitted between individuals. The first kind is composed of
display traits like a colour or a style, and the other preference
traits, which are linked to specific display traits. During their
lifetime, individuals acquire and display traits and preferences
through their interactions with other individuals. This set-up has
two consequences for the individual. First, the acquisition of
display traits will increase or modify the individual’s efficacy as a
cultural model. If an individual’s display traits are popular, then
that individual will be copied more frequently than an individual
with less popular display traits. Second, preferences acquired by
the individual determines which individuals it will tend to learn
from. Note that with these assumptions, there are no absolute or
permanent standards for what makes a display trait popular.
Among a group of individuals, these social learning processes
will give rise to a highly unstable but clearly patterned scenario of
cultural evolution, in which systems of preferences and display
traits change quickly in cycles of outburst and decay (Acerbi et al.,
2012). A cycle starts with a preference for a particular display trait
stochastically becoming common among currently popular indi-
viduals. This increases the spread of the preference in the
population, which in turn spreads the trait. However, as soon as
the trait starts to be common, the preference starts to disappear.
The reason for this is that individuals with the preference change
faster than individuals without the preference (see the discussion
about evolution of conservatism above). Thus, more individuals
with the preference will lose it than individuals without the
preference will gain it. An example from the model of Acerbi and
colleagues is shown in Fig. 6 with the lag between preference and
the corresponding display trait. The changes that occur in this
Fig. 5Mutual support may maintain system configurations over a long time
(where a time step is one round of interactions). The number of traits
supporting each other is two in the top panel, three in the middle panel and
four in the bottom panel, from a total of twenty traits. The figure shows the
frequencies of the supporting traits and the average frequency of the other
traits included in the simulations
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model can be faster than the rate of change occurring when traits
evolve independently of each other, because both the rise and fall
of the display trait are actively driven by the fast changes in
preferences.
In most examples in this paper, trait relationships are assumed
to be fixed and exogenously given, for instance by the nature of
traits, logical constraints, interaction with reality or genetic pre-
dispositions. However, in the simulation model of Fig. 6, the
relationships between traits themselves are subject to cultural
evolution.
Group phenomena
Cultural systems may also help to explain the emergence of
cultural groups. A single trait may suffice to distinguish between
members of different groups. Yet for the existence of such group-
defining traits to be a causal factor influencing the behaviour of
others—for instance, to serve as a signal for intra-group and
inter-group biases or for overt prejudice towards other groups—
and for the existence of the trait to be formed and maintained,
such a trait needs to be interdependent with those that induce the
relevant behaviour.
There are numerous examples of how important groups are for
dispersal of ideas about the world and our behaviours towards
other people, and how easily they form. A famous example is the
minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971), where
discrimination emerges between groups based on arbitrary divi-
sions. There is a vast empirical literature on group phenomena
that we cannot cover here, but there are for example metastudies
on group biases across cultures (Balliet et al., 2014; Romano et al.,
2017), and surveys on how opinions and beliefs are reinforced in
groups, polarising views on the societal level (Lamm and Myers,
1978; Isenberg, 1986; Abrams and Hogg, 1990) and on the
importance of sharing several cultural traits for emotional clo-
seness between individuals (Curry and Dunbar, 2013), showing
that a cultural systems approach to understanding group for-
mation may be viable.
Small systems of two or a few more traits may explain the
maintenance of pre-existing groups in specific situations. In the
modelling literature, there is typically an underlying strategic
situation in the specified form of a game, usually a prisoners’
dilemma, where the group structure supposedly facilitates
altruistic behaviour by coupling the trait of a group marker with
cooperative behaviour towards individuals with that marker. The
objective of such studies is to find a mechanism for an ingroup
bias. Typically such models are based on a biologically inherited
marker (e.g., Riolo et al., 2001; Hammond and Axelrod, 2006;
Jansen and van Baalen, 2006) that also requires spatial assortment
and kin selection (see Read, 2010; Jansson, 2013) or rapidly
changing markers (Fu et al., 2012). Changing the underlying
game can replace the spatial assortment (Jansson, 2015) and also
allow for cultural nonstatic markers to coevolve with behaviour
(McElreath et al., 2003; Efferson et al., 2008). Typically, the
models are based on strategic situations and try to explain
cooperative behaviour exclusively to members of your group
through some kind of greenbeard effect (Dawkins, 1976, 1982),
group selection (Choi and Bowles, 2007), direct reciprocity
through spatial structure or making group traits more flexible
than behavioural traits, or reputation (Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2007;
Grey et al., 2014) (for a review, see Masuda and Fu, 2015). As will
be illustrated below, a cultural systems approach may contrast
with such approaches by moving beyond strategic situations, pre-
existing groups and biological inheritance.
There are also models implicitly based on simple cultural
systems. Examples include polarisation and clustering based on
shared traits (Schelling, 1971; Axelrod, 1997), set structured
populations (Tarnita et al., 2009), and individuals structuring into
groups (Grey et al., 2014). Schelling’s (1971) segregation model,
for instance, entails simple systems that can maintain homo-
geneous views among actors, or opposing views that are some-
what balanced in numbers of advocates. The latter systems are
unstable, and the population ends up segregating into cliques of
homogenous sub-populations. Similar patterns emerge when
agents copy more from the agents in the vicinity with whom they
already have the most in common (Axelrod, 1997). This idea is a
bit more generalised and explicitly connected to cultural systems
in what is referred to as evolutionary set theory (Tarnita et al.,
2009). Here, agents can become and stop being members of any
number of available sets, that is, they have a number of cultural
traits, and they interact more with agents with whom they share
many traits, again in a strategic situation facilitating cooperation
between similar agents. An even more bottom-up approach to
group formation is one where the ideas are about the other
agents, and agents interact more when they gain positive
experience from previous interactions, and where they also
exchange views on third parties, leading to clustering (Grey et al.,
2014). Apart from cooperative interactions, there are also models
of how social network structure emerges from similarity in several
cultural traits (Centola et al., 2007; Centola, 2015).
Using the framework of cultural systems suggested here, we
can potentially generalise mechanisms of group formation,
polarisation and prejudice further, as by-products of relationships
between the traits that agents possess.
Consider the previous example of a cultural system with simple
attraction between traits A and B, and C and D, and repulsion
between all other pairs (Fig. 1). We saw that the cultural evolution
of such a system leads to a dominance of compatible traits.
Looking at the prevalence of the individual traits over time (Fig.
7), we see that, typically, the population has not converged on
sharing the same pair of compatible traits, but the two systems,
AB and CD, tend to coexist (for further details on the simulation,
see the Supplementary information). The relationships between
traits have thus led to the spontaneous formation of two
incompatible cultural groups.
Contrasting with the previous modelling approaches described
above, there are no utilities involved. Groups have not been
Fig. 6 Example of a fashion cycle generated by an evolving mixture of
display and preference traits. The example is based on the model of Acerbi
et al. (2012)
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0343-5 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2019) 5:131 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0343-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms 9
formed because it is rational or there is a selective pressure on the
individuals, nor of spatial or social assortment, and the groups are
defined only by cultural traits. This illustration merely points at
the potential of explaining various group phenomena, and this
particular example pertains more to polarisation into two camps
than ethnic groups. However, with more clusters of mutually
compatible traits, the population could polarise into several, and
potentially overlapping, groups.
Relationships can also vary and be endogenous. A recent and
related model specifically representing preferences (Goldberg and
Stein, 2018) finds cultural variation divided into two clusters also
when the compatibility between traits evolves culturally, through
associative diffusion that takes place by pairwise displays and
observations of cultural traits. When agents see two traits used
together, they increase their association between them and make
their preferences for them more similar, resulting in a cluster of
traits that a part of the population likes and another cluster that
they dislike, with the other part of the population having opposite
preferences.
These cultural systems also provide opportunities for path
dependence at the group level. New traits that enter the popu-
lation might be absorbed by individual members of only one of
the groups, depending on how they relate to existing traits, or
even more groups may form. When clusters of compatible traits
grow, the groups that are defined by them become more stable,
and limit exchange between groups. Trait dependencies should
thus not only allow for groups to form, but also for them to be
maintained over time, and eventually be associated with beliefs, as
well as behavioural and phenotypic traits. Examples may include
prejudice, group biases and closeness between individuals.
At a more abstract level, this illustrates how multiple cultural
systems can exist in parallel, also when the relationships between
the traits are exogenously given (e.g., set by physical reality or
logical constraints) and the potentially available traits are the
same for all individuals in the population. At a higher-order level,
cultural systems may themselves regulate the relationships
between traits (e.g., having A and B may regulate how compatible
C and D are). Cultural evolution may thus also give rise to
multiple cultural systems that differ not only in what traits are
included in a cluster, but also in how compatible those traits and
potential traits outside that cluster are.
Discussion
The cultural systems approach articulated here highlights a range
of novel and emerging research areas in the cultural evolutionary
literature. We have here focused on its implications for four such
areas: (i) the cultural evolution of ‘filters’ that modulate processes
involved in acquisition, invention, and transmission; (ii) the path
dependent trajectories of cultural systems that carry signals of
that system’s history; (iii) the rates of cultural change and
diversification; and (iv) the formation and dynamics of cultural
groups.
A noteworthy feature of these domains is that they display self-
organisation: that the relationships between traits play a large part
in which trait combinations are realised (in individuals, groups),
and that these may, in turn, influence the downstream acquisi-
tion, innovation, and diffusion of traits. So, for instance, filters
may themselves be culturally evolved decision rules aimed at
optimising various goals, and path dependent explorations of trait
pools may depend on the relationships holding between traits.
The modulating effects of self-organisation can be ephemeral,
systematic, and everything in between—with the effect and
duration of self-organised features contingent upon the vagaries
of cultural evolution. Above we focused on the possibility of
systematic influences, where cultural evolution itself provides the
circumstances for the reliable acquisition of trait complexes and
their effects in populations. This is for the simple reason that such
complexes are likely to have pervasive and long-term effects, with
broad implications.
The phenomenon of self-organisation is underappreciated in
the modelling work of cultural evolutionary theory—even if the
idea itself has some currency in the broader anthropological,
philosophical, and evolutionary literature (e.g., Kauffman, 1993;
Deacon, 1997; Sterelny, 2012). This may be because self-
organising structures are only visible in approaches that repre-
sent multiple traits and their interrelationships. As we hope to
have shown above, even when a few traits are employed, trait
relationships can generate a wide range of interesting and novel
dynamics. A cultural systems approach thus not only makes
conspicuous self-organising phenomena, but provides a flexible
set of tools for investigating and understanding them.
Another important feature of the systems approach is that it
can address questions at multiple levels. We have here illustrated
how cultural systems identify distinctive features at the trait,
individual, and population level. As illustrated in Figs 5–7, the
consideration of relationships between traits can enrich the
dynamics of population-level outcomes through microlevel
models. We also saw how such relationships could channel the
characteristics of individuals, modulate homogeneity and het-
erogeneity, and alter the pace of cultural change. Such processes
might also bring about group formation in stable clusters or
fashion cycles, and can explain aggregate measures at the group
level that are difficult to generate with independent traits.
To take one example, when discussing rates of change in
fashions or fads, we highlighted how the acquisition of preference
Fig. 7 Prevalence of cultural systems over time. Most agents have either traits A and B, or C and D
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and preferred display traits can generate rapidly fluctuating
dynamics at the aggregate level. A cultural systems approach can
thus complement already existing strategies at employing
‘population thinking’ (Lewens, 2015) by exploring how the
endogenous links within cultural systems interact with indivi-
duals to realise population-level phenomena. Mapping the link
between microlevel mechanisms and macrolevel outcomes to the
scheme of Coleman (1986), cultural systems along with fre-
quencies of traits in the population pose structural and situational
constraints on agents, who adopt traits selectively through
copying and filtering, producing updated frequencies and a new
subset of associated structural and situational constraints.
Thus, a systems approach provides a framework for under-
standing how individual actions generate macroevolutionary
causes, and how these can feed back to influence microevolu-
tionary interactions, via their influence on trait availability and
interrelationships (such as preferences). Our models have
focused predominantly on the first of these mechanisms, point-
ing to areas where a systems approach can illuminate how
individual-level behaviour generates population-level patterns.
For instance, trait interrelationships can drive differentiation
between cultural groups and modulate the tempo and mode of
cultural evolution. We have further suggested that cultural filters
may be an important mechanism at play to change macro-
evolutionary patterns by influencing and modifying these trait
interrelationships.
At the same time, we pointed to empirical work showing how
population-level causes can influence individual-level behaviour
by modulating trait availability and desirability. Heidi Colleran’s
work on the diffusion of contraceptive technology demonstrates
how the influence of the average behaviour of the population
(here, religiosity and education) can influence the availability and
attitudes towards contraceptive knowledge and use. Group
dynamics too can polarise and cause clustering of traits among
distinct populations, further altering trait availability and
desirability.
It is also possible that systems themselves may interact at the
macro-level. Though we have not focused on such a possibility in
this paper, we above highlighted the work of Erik Gjesfjeld and
colleagues (2016) who explored the changing rates of origination
and extinction in the production of car models. The system-level
properties that feed into such origination and extinction rates—
broad relationships between manufacturing strategies, state
policies, demand cycles, oil production, and the like—provide yet
another avenue of potential investigation for the systems
approach.
As we hope to have stressed above, the idea of cultural systems
is not a new one. It is not only a consensus view, but one that has
long been subject to analysis and theorising in anthropological
thought, especially where a range of thinkers have described
cultures as systems subject to evolutionary change (Steward, 1955;
Sahlins, 1960; Kroeber and Parsons, 1958; Geertz, 1973; Diener,
1980; for a general review, see Carneiro, 2003). Yet for the most
part, these researchers deployed systems thinking in a qualitative
way—often drawing a variety of analogies between cultures and
specific systems like organisms or species. What is distinct about
the approach motivated here—and what it adds to the already
existing use of systems thinking—is that it employs the tools of
formal modelling. The bottom-up style of systems modelling used
in our examples is flexible and open-ended, providing the
opportunity to explore a wide range of hypotheses by creatively
modifying and combining different combinations of trait uni-
verses and agent properties.
This approach complements and generalises some recent
models that have also adopted a strategy of modelling multiple
traits and their interrelationships. Goldberg and Stein (2018), for
instance, employ a similar framework to explore the role of what
they call ‘constraint satisfaction’ in changing the trait inter-
relationships in a small trait pool (what they call a ‘semantic
network’). This work explores how the compatibility and
incompatibility of traits can be socially constructed and modified
over time. In a different vein, Claidière and colleagues (2014)
employ ‘evolutionary causal matrices’ to explore the effect that
trait types have on the absolute number of said trait types over
time. This is mostly analogous to what we have discussed as
selective trait filters. Without explicitly representing the com-
patibility or incompatibility between traits, or the specific decision
rules that determine the acquisition or modification of traits,
these matrices directly model the filtering effects that traits have
on the downstream composition of both individual and group
systems.
Speaking generally, we have here illustrated how a systems
approach—particularly one that builds upon the strategy of
investigating the strategies of acquiring, innovating, and diffusing
culture in a rich trait universe—generates new tools for explaining
cultural evolutionary phenomena. Already, the results given
above reveal multiple areas for future enquiry. In particular,
exploration that goes beyond disjunctive compatibility or
incompatibility has the potential to generate a richer set of
dynamics. At the same time, building in different kinds of trait
relationships—such as those necessitating the sequential acqui-
sition of certain traits—offers the possibility of exploring more
realistic trait universes.
As we have suggested in numerous places above, a systems
approach also has the potential to connect with, and help to
explore, other issues in cultural evolutionary theory. In particular,
it seems apt for exploring issues at the intersection of demography,
population size, and the size of population-level cultural systems
(Henrich, 2004; Powell et al., 2009. Cf. Vaesen et al., 2016). Along
the same lines, it seems apt for connecting with the palaeoan-
thropological literature on the rates of change in cultural traits over
time, where this includes both stasis and rapid change. The radical
stasis of lithic technologies in the lower and middle Pleistocene and
the radical change in culture that occurs in the Holocene (Mithen,
2005. Cf. McBrearty and Brooks, 2000) provide a rich set of phe-
nomena for exploration by a systems approach.
As we noted above, many of the extant cultural evolutionary
models are based on those developed in evolutionary biology.
Researchers in cultural evolution motivate the adoption of such
models by means of analogy: the seeming similarity of trans-
mission processes in cultural and genetic evolution has given
warrant for the exploration of cultural evolutionary dynamics
based on models using replicator dynamics or other population-
genetic tools. We do not here wish to contribute to the growing
literature that explores how researchers have developed analogy
(e.g., Sperber, 1996; Lewens, 2015). Instead, we merely wish to
point out that analogies often function to highlight salient ave-
nues of empirical research, and that there are many such fruitful
avenues.
We have here been inspired in part by work in systems biology
—particularly that which describes the evolution of organisation
and constraint within complex dynamic systems (Kauffman,
1993). To illustrate this analogy, consider HOX genes—an
important class of deeply conserved homeobox genes that reg-
ulate patterns of development across almost all eukaryotes
(Bürglin and Affolter, 2016). HOX genes regulate the site-specific
development of morphology, so that limbs grow in species-typical
fashion (Krumlauf, 1994), and manipulation of these genes can
lead to odd mutations, such as Drosophila with legs where
antennae normally form (Carroll, 2005). HOX genes are one
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instance of a structure that, once it has arisen, persists over time
—forming a set of tools that can be tweaked to generate diversity.
They serve as a signal and explanation for the similarity in body
plan across different evolutionary groups.
Systems biology studies such homeobox genes as an instance
of ‘constraint-based generality’ (Green, 2015)—here understood
as the ways in which systems tend to self-assemble a structure
that constrains the possibilities in which it can change in the
future (O’Malley, 2012). Some of these structural constraints
that researchers have identified include core components and
weak regulatory linkage (Kirschner and Gerhart, 2006), gen-
erative entrenchment (Wimsatt, 2001), and network robustness
(Jaeger et al., 2015). These are structures that limit the evolu-
tionary trajectories likely to occur, but in so doing, minimise the
risk of lethal mutations, and, perhaps, increase the tempo of
evolution.
Our guiding thought is that similar kinds of constraint-based
principles and self-assembling features can help in under-
standing cultural systems. Like HOX genes, it seems likely that
at least some cultural traditions are tightly integrated in virtue of
their role in ensuring the socioeconomic viability of cultures
over time (cf. Boyd et al., 1997). We expect these ‘cultural cores’
(Steward, 1955) to share several features, given their role in
mitigating recurrent socioecological problems concerning
resource allocation, free-rider problems, warfare, and the like
(Sterelny, 2012, 2016). Such cores could be usefully explored
using a constraint-based approach that investigates the likely
trajectories that populations will traverse over evolutionary time
frames.
Yet here we also urge caution. Along with other researchers
(e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Mesoudi, 2011), we would stress
that cultural evolution works differently from biological evolu-
tion. As has often been noted, the social nature of culture means
that ideas, traditions, beliefs, and technologies can readily diffuse
between populations. The free-flowing transmissibility of culture
—though analogous to a limited extent with horizontal gene
transfer—is likely to generate unique dynamics and rates of
change. Cultural traits are not necessarily transmitted as one
package, but are acquired and lost in multiple steps, with the
consequence that they can be individually selected on how
compatible they are to other acquired traits. This suggests that
realised cultural traits in a population may have radically different
histories and transmission dynamics.
Beyond developing new analogies to on-going empirical
research, a systems approach to culture has the potential to
connect with the wide range of humanities and social science
literature that have made general hypotheses about the formation,
nature, and dynamics of cultural change. As we suggested above,
the idea that culture can be understood as a system has been a
mainstay of anthropological thinking in the twentieth century.
Yet these ideas are also found in the classical works of sociology,
linguistics, and economics (Marx, 1867/1990, Saussure, 1959,
Durkheim, 1995), and are now widespread throughout the
humanities and social sciences. To touch on just a few areas,
systems thinking seems to be implicated in understanding gender
structures (e.g., Walby, 1989), social norms, attitudes and ideol-
ogy (e.g., Boutyline and Vaisey, 2017; Inglehart, 2018; Jansson
et al., 2013; Strimling et al., 2019), and systems of language (e.g.,
Greenhill et al., 2017), technology (e.g., Franklin, 1999), economy
(e.g., Wallerstein, 1974), and religion (e.g., Geertz, 1973). A sys-
tems approach provides a promising bridge to the as of yet
unexplored wealth of theorising about culture coming from
within the humanities and social sciences.
Of course, a systems approach brings with it a distinct set of
challenges. Compared to population-level models of single or
independent traits, incorporating relationships between traits
introduces a higher level of complexity. This decreases the
tractability of cultural evolution models, while simultaneously
increasing degrees of freedom. Given the wide variety of possible
outcomes, modifying parameters might induce significant chan-
ges to modelling results.
It is uncontroversial that culture is an organised system. What
we have argued here is that explanations of several cultural
phenomena are sensitive to the relationships between traits, and,
further, that empirical and theoretical research suggests that
these phenomena are central to culture and cultural change. In
other words, acknowledging trait interrelationships opens up
rich dynamics that can generate empirically observable patterns
unattainable for models that represent traits in isolation. This
suggests that we should not shy away from the challenge of
adding this extra layer of complexity to our cultural evolutionary
models.
Simulation model
In the simulations, there is a universe of cultural traits with
relationships between them. A relationship between two traits
consists of a compatibility score of 1 if the traits are compatible,
and −1 if they are incompatible. A universe is specified for each
illustration in the manuscript (see below). There are 100 agents,
each with an individual cultural repertoire, consisting of a subset
of traits from the universe. At the outset, the agents are naive,
with empty repertoires, but acquire traits through innovation (of
traits from the universe) and copying from other agents.
The agents meet in random interactions. One round of inter-
actions, or a time step, includes copying, invention and a birth
death process. First, each agent, the receiver, samples one other
agent as a cultural model. The model randomly selects one of the
traits, i, in its repertoire for display to the receiver. The receiver
copies the trait with a probability determined by the average
compatibility score s of the trait with the receiver’s current
repertoire, that is,
s ¼ 1
Rj j
X
j2R
cij
where cij is the compatibility between i and j, and R ≠ ; is the set
of traits in the receiver’s repertoire. If the receiver has no traits,
R ¼ ;, then s≔ 0. The probability of copying is determined by
the logistic equation
pðsÞ ¼ 1
1þ e10s
The constant 10 was arbitrarily chosen, but values below
around 5 give the score a small influence and the results were not
sensitive to scores above that value.
Each agent then invents a new trait with probability 0.001; that
is, it randomly selects a trait from the universe and adds it to its
repertoire (if the agent does not already possess the trait). Finally,
each agent dies with probability 0.01 (0.0025 in Section 6 – the
lower rate provides more stability), and is replaced by a new
naive agent.
In the sections ‘What is a cultural system?’ and ‘Group phe-
nomena’, the universe consists of four traits, A, B, C and D, where
A and B are mutually compatible, and C and D are also mutually
compatible, but all other pairs of traits are mutually incompatible.
In the section ‘Stability versus change’, the universe consists of
20 traits. Four of these are named, A, B, C and D. In the first
simulation A and B are compatible, in the second A, B and C are
all compatible, and in the third all four are compatible. The
remaining trait pairs (including C and D in the first, and D in the
second simulation) are set to be mutually compatible with
probability 0.1, and otherwise they are mutually incompatible.
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See data availability to access the code (in Python).
Data availability
The models used in this paper were implemented in Python. The
program along with code to generate data for the figures are
available in a Dataverse repository: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/
KKDZX8.
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Notes
1 For some recent reviews of this interdisciplinary literature and the variety of empirical
and theoretical methods employed, see Mesoudi, 2011, and Henrich, 2016.
2 While the cognitive capacity for such ‘filters’ would be genetically evolved, as cultural
traits are acquired, they will be increasingly shaped by cultural evolution. However,
this is not to discount the likely existence and relevance of innate biases that modulate
and influence processes involved in cultural acquisition, innovation, and change. For
some discussion of these issues, see Cowie, 1999, Sterelny, 2012, Lewens, 2015, and
Heyes, 2018.
3 Losing a trait can represent different actions depending on what is being studied. An
individual can forget a piece of information, lose a skill or a preference, or suppress the
use and display of the trait (if the focus is on visible culture). If, for example, trait A is a
preference for X and B a preference against it, then B replaces A.
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